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A cross-disciplinary team of scientists and engineers applied expertise gained in Lunar Lander development to the 
conceptual design of a long-duration, deep space habitat for Near Earth Asteroid (NEA) missions.  The design 
reference mission involved two launches to assemble 5-modules for a 380-day round trip mission carrying 4 crew 
members.   The conceptual design process yielded a number of interesting debates, some of which could be 
significant design drivers in a detailed Deep Space Habitat (DSH) design.  These issues included:  Design to 
minimize crew radiation exposure, launch loads, communications challenges, docking system and hatch 
commonality, pointing and visibility, consumables, and design for contingency operations.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
I.I NEA Design Reference Mission 
The* design team was directed to work to National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Design 
Reference Mission 34B.  For the purpose of this 
exercise, it was assumed that the mission required 157 
days transit from Earth, followed by 30 days at NEA 
2008EV5, and 193 day return to Earth, for a crewed 
mission duration total of 380 days.  Several cases were 
considered for launch and assembly timing.  The 
“Hybrid 2” option selected required the habitat module 
to be launched 825 days before the crew arrived.  Both 
3- and 4-crew missions were proposed, but designers 
assumed a 4-crew mission as the worst case in terms of 
sizing.   
 
I.II Architecture Assumptions 
The Deep Space Habitat (DSH) was intended to be 
part of an integrated vehicle, shown in Figure 1, which 
also includes a Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) module; 
a Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (CPS); a Multi-Mission 
Space Exploration Vehicle (MMSEV); and a Multi 
Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), also known as Orion. 
The architecture elements would be assembled in earth 
orbit.  For this exercise, DSH was assumed to be a 
single, cylindrically-shaped module  
The mission begins with the DSH and SEP launch, 
and an unmanned loiter for up to 825 days prior to the 
crew’s arrival in Orion.  The MMSEV would be 
launched separately and rendezvous with the DSH and 
SEP.  The DSH would be launched into a high elliptical 
earth orbit (60,000 km by 400,000 km) using a kick 
stage. Using the SEP, the vehicle would narrow the 
ellipse to 407 km by 400,000 km, to rendezvous with 
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Orion and a CPS in low earth orbit (407 km by 407 km), 
then beginning the trajectory to rendezvous with the 
asteroid 2008EV5. 
This DSH was intended to provide in-space 
accommodations and care for the crew, serve as the 
primary command center for controlling the integrated 
stack, and provide a work platform for science mission 
objectives and vehicle maintenance activities from low 
Earth orbit to the destination and back again. After 
providing the Earth departure burn, CPS would be 
discarded. SEP would provide in-space propulsion and 
power between Earth orbit and the NEA. Once at the 
NEA, the MMSEV would provide short duration crew 
sorties between the DSH and the NEA, and would 
remain at the NEA while the remaining elements return 
to Earth.  Upon reaching Earth orbit, the crew would 
discard DSH and SEP and return to the Earth’s surface 
in Orion.  
 
Fig. 1: Integrated Vehicle Stack 
 
II. APPROACH 
The NASA team was organized into thirteen 
subsystem disciplines: Command and Data Handling, 
Communications and Tracking, Extravehicular Activity 
(EVA), Flight Software, Guidance, Navigation and 
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Control, Human Factors, Environmental Control and 
Life Support, Structures and Mechanisms, Electrical 
Power, Propulsion, and Thermal Control.  In parallel 
with the individual discipline teams broadly defining 
each subsystem, vehicle integration specialists 
developed the concept of operations, decomposed the 
top level functional requirements, and integrated mass 
and equipment lists. The entire team was involved in 
evaluating impacts across subsystem boundaries, 
considering integrated vehicle performance, and settling 
on mutually agreeable assumptions and design 
decisions.  Two design iterations produced a 
preliminary concept that was then used to support 
mission design trade studies, and as a parametric 
reference for other habitat variations.    
 
III. GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Not every architecture element or module (DSH, 
CPS, SEP, MMSEV, Orion MPCV) has been developed 
to the same level of detail. Some of these elements are 
entirely conceptual at this point, making cross-team 
integration and optimization difficult.  For the purpose 
of this exercise, certain ground rules and assumptions 
were established so that reasonably good choices could 
efficiently be made for the DSH design. 
 
III.I MMSEV and Orion Habitation  
Except for emergency safe haven use, it was 
assumed that the Orion and MMSEV would only be 
used for equipment stowage—not habitation—while the 
integrated vehicle was in transit.  Because MMSEV 
remains at the NEA, it is not available for safe haven 
use during the return voyage.  It was also assumed that 
the DSH would resupply depleted consumables such as 
oxygen, water, or power to MMSEV between sorties, 
and to Orion prior to crew Earth return. 
 
III.II EVA Operations  
The DSH was not assumed to support nominal EVA.  
The MMSEV is optimized to support EVA exploration, 
and the Orion MPCV has emergency capabilities to 
survive cabin leaks for at least a short time.  The DSH 
was expected to support contingency EVAs, since the 
MMSEV is not always present, and the Orion MPCV 
cannot support Primary Life Support System (PLSS)-
based EVAs that require operating outside the 
immediate vicinity of the Orion module. 
 
III.III Consumables 
Because it was impractical to carry the mass of all 
water and oxygen needed for such a long mission 
duration, it was assumed that regenerative life support 
technologies would be employed.   
 
 
 
IV. ISSUES AND DESIGN DRIVERS 
The conceptual design process identified a number 
of interesting issues, some of which could become 
significant design drivers in a detailed DSH design.   
 
IV.I Equipment Life Issues 
Unlike the International Space Station (ISS), DSH 
will not have the luxury of regular resupply deliveries, 
meaning it must launch with everything needed for the 
1,205 day total mission duration. Limited life 
consumables, such as food, may require special 
packaging.  Mass and volume limitations will force the 
crew to disassemble equipment to make internal 
repairs—no easy feat in microgravity—rather than 
simply reach for a large replacement unit.  The 825 day 
initial unmanned loiter period will also require remote 
vehicle health monitoring and spares already installed in 
parallel for critical systems 
 
IV.II Design to Minimize Crew Radiation Exposure 
One key issue for a long-duration mission is crew 
health risk due to Galactic Cosmic Ray (GCR) and 
Solar Particle Event (SPE) exposure. Unfortunately, all 
three methods typically used for radiation protection1 
are difficult to implement in a DSH mission: 1) Crew 
exposure time cannot be limited until new propulsion 
technologies are able to reduce transit time; 2) in the 
confines of a small spaceship on a mission beyond 
Earth’s protective magnetic field, there are limited 
options for moving the crew away from the radiation 
source; and 3) the habitat’s size and mass constraints 
limit the practical thickness of radiation shielding that 
can be carried.    
Under the circumstances, the team incorporated 
design features to provide as much protection as 
reasonably possible.   Assuming that a short, squat 
cylinder would enable the crew to move farther from the 
walls than a long, thin cylinder would, the DSH shell 
was set at 7 m (22.9 ft) diameter, the maximum that 
would fit within the launch shroud dynamic envelope 
(allowing for external micrometeoroid shields, cabling, 
and radiators). Stowage for food, clothing, and 
equipment was designated along the outer diameter 
(Figure 2), between the crew and the shell, providing 
some lateral radiation protection. It was assumed that 
the architecture elements mounted above and below the 
DSH would provide some axial shielding. Although 
practical for radiation protection, this approach has 
other design implications.  For example, stowage 
located against the shell wall must be moveable in the 
event the crew must access the shell for repairs due to a 
micrometeoroid impact.   
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Fig. 2: Shaded areas represent stowage, which is 
used as crew radiation protection  
 
Four individual crew quarters were positioned 
together at the center of the module, surrounded by a 10 
cm thick integrated “water wall” radiation shield 
(Figure 3).  Although this exercise stopped short of 
detailed design, several different implementation 
schemes were discussed.  One interesting design 
incorporated portable water bags which could be 
reconfigured as needed, allowing the entire water wall 
to be collapsed into a smaller—but thicker--radiation 
shelter in the event of a particularly strong solar storm. 
 
 
Fig. 3: “Water Wall” around crew quarters 
 
Because the conceptual water wall carries 2,650 kg 
(5,842 lbs) of water, it is tempting to imagine this water 
serving dual purposes, though that may result in a 
complicated water distribution and control system. 
Leakage of such a large quantity of water into the cabin 
also poses risks to the crew and spacecraft.  Finally, to 
minimize the structural design impact of launching such 
a large mass positioned near the center of the module, it 
may be necessary to launch the water in a tank mounted 
closer to the structure’s perimeter, and fill the water 
wall once the DSH is in orbit. 
Note that water wall thickness (and mass) could 
change once the effectiveness of perimeter stowage at 
reducing crew radiation exposure is better established. 
However, this requires knowing precise materials of 
construction and equipment placement, which was not 
done for this study. 
 
IV.III Docking System and Hatch Commonality 
Operational constraints drove the DSH to include a 
total of four docking systems and three crew hatches: a 
docking port on one end for the SEP; a docking port and 
hatch on the opposite end for crew transfer to Orion; a 
docking port and hatch along the cylinder length for 
crew transfer to the MMSEV; and a docking port, hatch, 
and Airlock opposite the MMSEV docking port for 
contingency operations such as EVA repairs or 
emergency MMSEV docking.  Ideally, all of these 
docking systems would be of a common design to 
simplify operations and reduce costs.  But different 
architecture elements, designed at different times for 
different purposes, may not necessarily specify common 
equipment. For example, current MMSEV and Orion 
hatch designs perform well for their intended use in 
shirt-sleeve conditions but may be marginal for large 
crewmembers wearing pressurized spacesuits. This 
could force DSH to carry two different types of 
docking/hatch systems or result in a DSH mass penalty 
to carry an adapter and remote installation system to 
convert ports for contingency use, where pressure-suited 
translation is required.  
How large must an EVA crew transfer hatch and 
tunnel be? The answer depends on the type of EVA suit 
used in the DSH.  The minimum clearance of the 
current NASA Docking System (NDS) Standard2, with 
the docking petals removed, is 0.81 m (32 in).  Reduced 
gravity testing3 performed at the NASA Johnson Space 
Center evaluated the reach, access, visibility and range 
of motion for two different spacesuit configurations 
inside a 0.81 m (32 in) diameter translation tunnel 
(Figure 4).  
 
 
Fig. 4: Reduced gravity testing of hatch operation in 
0.81 m (32 in) diameter transfer tunnel. 
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Test subjects were asked to simulate common hatch 
actuation motions, such as overhead wrist rotation and 
crank motions. While these tasks were generally found 
to be possible, testing showed that clearance was highly 
dependent on suit configuration, particularly protrusions 
on the back and chest, which has implications to future 
EVA suit designs.   
In addition to crew translation, the contingency EVA 
hatch will also be used to bring damaged external 
equipment inside the spacecraft for repairs that may be 
too delicate for gloved hands.  Any equipment requiring 
this type of repair must be sized to fit through the hatch. 
Finally, some thought must be given to active versus 
passive docking mechanisms.  The current NDS design 
can be implemented such that either side of the docking 
interface can serve as the active partner, though there is 
a significant mass penalty for this flexibility.  At least 
one side of each docking interface must provide active 
capture—but which side? The design team assumed the 
worst-case of all DSH docking ports carrying the 
heavier, active mechanism, but mass could be reduced if 
the passive function were shifted to other elements.   
 
IV.IV Internal Cabin Pressure Commonality 
Once the MMSEV, Orion, and DSH modules are 
integrated together and the hatches between them 
opened, all three must operate at the same internal cabin 
pressure and appropriate oxygen concentration to ensure 
crew and vehicle safety, streamline operations, and 
preserve consumable gasses. Unfortunately, different 
vehicles having different primary purposes do not 
always share common internal pressure characteristics. 
Vehicles such as the MMSEV—whose primary 
mission is to serve as an EVA platform—prefer a lower 
cabin pressure with higher oxygen concentration to 
quickly condition EVA crew members for space suit 
operations at pressures as low as 29.6 kPa (4.3 psia). A 
reduced pressure atmosphere is also critical for the 
successful use of suitports.  For this reason, current 
MMSEV design concepts assume a 55.2 kPa (8 psia), 
32% oxygen nominal cabin environment.   Orion, on the 
other hand, is primarily intended as a short-duration 
transit vehicle with no planned EVAs, and therefore has 
no reason to operate at such reduced pressures.   
However, Orion may need to dock with the ISS, which 
operates close to Earth sea-level conditions of 14.7 psia 
and 21% oxygen.  Currently, Orion intends to operate4 
with a cabin pressure set point between 65.5 kPa (9.5 
psia) and 102.7 kPa (14.9 psia), and up to 30% oxygen 
concentration at pressures below 70.3 kPa (10.2 psia). 
Ideally, all three vehicles would settle on a mutually 
agreeable operating pressure and concentration. Because 
Orion is not currently planning to operate above 30% 
oxygen concentration, this would drive MMSEV to 
higher pressures (and hence less efficient EVA 
operations) or it would require Orion to recertify for 
lower pressure set points and higher oxygen 
concentrations.  If neither of these approaches were 
possible, then DSH would be forced to keep the hatch to 
one vehicle closed when the other was open, and adjust 
pressure as needed, which complicates operations and 
wastes consumable gasses.  
For the purpose of this exercise, subsystem 
designers assumed 70.3 kPa (10.2 psia) nominal cabin 
operations across the integrated vehicle stack. 
 
IV.V Structural Design Issues 
The DSH team encountered a number of interesting 
structural design challenges, particularly with respect to 
launch and in-space maneuvering loads.  To minimize 
mass, designers assumed composite-Aluminum 
honeycomb sandwich construction.  Floors were 
designed to sit on rings with only vertical connectivity 
to minimize stress concentrations.  DSH control mass 
was assumed to be 27,930 kg (61,575 lbs), with 
unallocated mass distributed evenly along the floors, 
within 2m (6.6 ft) from the pressure shell.   
One particular area of concern was the effect of 5 g 
axial and 2 g lateral launch loads when most of the 
internal mass was supported by the large diameter 
floors.  To prevent excessive stress and deformation of 
the floors, the analysis team recommended a central 
structural support, and two concepts were discussed 
(Figure 5): a vertical composite tube, or temporary 
suspension cables or tension rods that could be removed 
after launch.  
 
 
Fig. 5:  Internal Structural Support Concepts 
 
Launch loads were also a concern for both the 
internal airlock and the spacecraft adapter structure that 
connects the DSH to the rocket’s upper stage.  Securing 
the estimated 500 kg (1,102 lbs) airlock mass could 
likely be done with careful placement of the central 
structural support mentioned above.  The spacecraft 
adapter structure was more problematic. A cone, rather 
than strut, adapter was selected, as it must be stiff 
enough to prevent excessive sway and low frequency 
issues, and providing lateral support via the launch 
shroud may not be economical.  Structural analysis of 
the conceptual spacecraft adapter design indicated 
potential buckling load issues that should be addressed 
in future detailed design work. 
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Another area of concern was the 0.25 g axial in-
space maneuvering loads with a 6,547 kg (14,434 lb) 
MMSEV attached at the DSH side docking port.  Unless 
crew exercise equipment is isolated from the structure, 
fatigue may also be an issue.  
To isolate smoke or contamination to one area, the 
Environmental Control and Life Support team suggested 
emergency covers on the passageways between the four 
DSH floors.   However, the structural design team 
cautioned that making each floor a separate pressure 
compartment would result in a significant mass penalty.  
The compromise solution was to include sliding “pocket 
doors” between floors to aid in emergency response, but 
it was acknowledged that these doors would not allow 
selective depressurization of compartments. 
 
IV.VI Pointing and Visibility 
An inspection of the proposed architecture in Figure 
1 shows that the large solar arrays on the SEP and Orion 
have high potential to interfere with line-of-sight 
pointing and visibility for DSH communications, 
tracking, guidance, and navigation equipment.  
One possible solution to this problem is to extend 
navigation and communications equipment out onto 
long booms though this, in turn, may create new 
problems. Spacecraft vibration—such as that induced by 
crew physical exercise or during docking/undocking 
operations—could be transmitted along the booms, 
disrupting sensitive tracking equipment.  Other 
problems include increased structural mass due to the 
booms, increased power distribution mass to reach 
extended equipment, and more complicated EVA repair 
and maintenance of equipment installed on booms. 
The integrated vehicle configuration also posed 
design challenges for the Thermal design team.  
Although the large DSH shell provides ample area for 
body-mounted radiator panels, care must be taken to 
ensure the radiators are not shadowed by other 
elements, such as the MMSEV or SEP solar arrays. 
Schedule constraints for this particular study did not 
allow consideration of alternative configurations or 
element designs, though those options should be 
considered for future studies. 
 
IV.VII Water 
Although current in-space water processing 
technologies with 90% or better recycling efficiency can 
dramatically reduce overall water mass carried on a long 
mission, one interesting question remains: how much 
water to start with?  The answer depends largely on how 
much water is needed at any one time, and the worst-
case repair scenario for a faulty water processor.   
The Environmental Control and Life Support team 
estimated a crew of four would require a total of 5,374.1 
kg (11,848 lbs) of life support water during a 380 day 
mission (Table 1), though only 11.6 kg (25.6 lbs) of 
potable water would be needed on any given day.  
Metabolic consumption, including crew exercise, was 
estimated using human-systems integration 
requirements developed by the Constellation Program. 
Life support water depleted from Orion and MMSEV, 
and resupplied by DSH, is also included in Table 1.   
 
Potable Water  Mass (kg) 
Deep Space Habitat  
 †Metabolic Consumption 3880.0 
 Hygiene  620.8 
 Contingency    411.1 
MMSEV  
 ‡Tank Top Off (4 Sorties)   84.8 
Orion MPCV  
 Tank Top Off (10 day return)  123.0 
TOTAL (kg) 5374.1 
Table 1: Life Support Water Required for a 4 Crew, 380 
Day Mission. 
 
Because only a small amount of potable water must 
be on hand at any given time, a relatively modest water 
tank paired with a high efficiency processor could 
reduce the mass of water launched from Earth by 
thousands of kilograms, depending on water processor 
efficiency and the number of contingency supply days 
required. It was estimated that a crew of 4 would need 
on average about 12 kg (26.5 lb) of water per day.  
Water for recharging the MMSEV must be delivered 
quickly, and should also be stored in a tank since 
generating from wastewater on demand may take too 
long.  As noted above, an additional 2,650 kg (5,842 
lbs) of water was required for crew radiation protection, 
in the form of a 10 cm-thick water “wall” surrounding 
the sleeping quarters.  Unlike crew hygiene and 
hydration water, radiation shield water would not be 
recycled if it remained stagnant in the water wall. 
 
IV.VIII Communication Challenges 
Because the spacecraft will be as much as 0.33 
Astronomical Units (AU) from mission control, the one-
way light-time communication latency will be on the 
order of 165 seconds. This is much longer than the one-
way 1.35 second latency between Earth and the Apollo 
crews who landed on the Moon, and raises interesting 
questions about the communication strategy between 
DSH and Earth.  Unlike current ISS crews who are 
accustomed to near real-time guidance from mission 
control, the latency issue will likely require greater crew 
autonomy and decision-making. Alternatives to real-
time voice communication such as texting, e-mail, and 
                                                          
† Estimated using NASA CxP 700245.  
‡ Includes metabolic consumption and 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) resupply. 
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voice messaging may also be more widely employed in 
a DSH mission. 
In addition to the latency problem, the distance 
between DSH and Earth also increases the amount of 
radiated power required in conjunction with a high gain 
antenna for higher data rates to overcome signal losses. 
With current efficiencies of only 33%, this means that a 
40 Watt Radio Frequency (RF) output would require 
120 Watt power input, which potentially impacts both 
the power and thermal subsystem designs. 
Although optical communication is a promising 
technology, it is not yet mature enough to overcome 
pointing inaccuracy risks, particularly on a distant 
spacecraft subject to crew-induced vibration. In order to 
transmit high resolution imagery, the DSH team 
selected a Ka-Band system for its superior data rate 
capability of up to 50 Megabits Per Second (Mbps), 
depending on distance, antenna size and amplification 
available.  However, because Ka-Band can be disrupted 
by inclement weather on Earth, designers also 
recommended a secondary X-Band system. Although 
X-band transmissions may be as slow as 18 Kilobits per 
Second (kbps), it is a reliable backup or supplement to a 
primary Ka-Band system. 
 
IV.IX Electrical Power and Distribution 
Cable mass for a spacecraft as large and complex as 
DSH can become an issue without careful design 
consideration.  The DSH Avionics team set a design 
goal of no more than 3.05 m (10 ft) length for any given 
wire harness. Locating control systems close to 
interfacing effectors and sensors, and specifying passive 
wireless external temperature and pressure sensors 
helped to minimize estimated cable mass.   
For the purpose of this exercise, it was assumed that 
each module would produce the power required to 
operate independently.  This may not be practical given 
a particular integrated vehicle configuration, but 
because mating elements are intended for use in other 
integrated configurations, bound for other destinations, 
this exercise did not include the integrated power load 
assessments that would be required in a more detailed 
design effort. 
 
IV.X Contingency Scenarios 
Discussion of worst-case contingency scenarios 
yielded a number of interesting design drivers.  For 
example, the possibility of a crew fatality on a mission 
so far from Earth was found to affect the ECLS design.  
In-cabin fire or toxic chemical release scenarios 
prompted discussion of Orion safe haven placement 
within the vehicle stack, whether the floors within the 
module should be open to air flow or individual 
pressure compartments, and where to locate high risk 
items, such as high pressure oxygen equipment.   
Although most contingency scenarios were deemed 
relatively low probability or fairly straightforward to 
mitigate, DSH decompression due to micrometeoroid 
penetration of the shell posed a number of challenges on 
such a long-duration mission.  The DSH team assumed 
that a leak detection and repair kit would be manifested 
(similar to that currently carried on board the 
International Space Station) but it was noted that the 
leak repair method could drive shell material selection 
and construction decisions.   Shell repairs made from 
outside the vehicle could pose hazards to an EVA repair 
crew, such as contamination from leaking fluid lines, 
electrocution, or glove punctures due to the jagged 
edges of damaged equipment.  Ideally, repairs would be 
made from inside the vehicle, but this would require 
rapid relocation of stowage along the damaged wall, 
which would drive stowage system design.  In the event 
of a large leak, the crew could be forced to perform 
repairs wearing protective pressure suits.  Working 
inside the vehicle while wearing EVA suits would be 
cumbersome and difficult in some locations; the smaller 
launch/entry suits would be preferred, but it was noted 
that specially designed gloves would be needed to 
handle repair tools, and longer life support umbilical 
hoses may be needed to reach remote areas of the cabin.  
One strategy discussed was to perform a gross leak 
repair from inside the cabin to slow the leak, then 
follow up with an EVA repair once the situation is 
stabilized. 
The DSH team discussed options in the event a leak 
cannot be repaired.  As a last resort, the crew could 
permanently retreat to Orion, though this would be 
extremely challenging, particularly if the failure 
occurred early in the mission.  This contingency would 
also require pre-planning to ensure long life support 
umbilical hoses were available for suited crew to 
periodically retrieve food and water from DSH, and 
empty the waste containment system, In this last resort 
scenario, the DSH water processor would have to be 
capable of operating in a vacuum, and the crew must be 
able to control the vehicle stack from Orion.  It was also 
noted that the radiation protection “water wall” would 
freeze if the DSH depressurizes.  Because of the myriad 
complications resulting from cabin depressurization, the 
DSH team concluded that robust micrometeoroid 
protection would be a wise investment.  Although this 
exercise stopped short of a detailed shield design, one 
interesting concept proposed exploring the synergy 
between radiator panels and micrometeoroid shields. 
 
V. APPLICABILITY TO OTHER 
SPACECRAFT 
Although the particular transit vehicle discussed in 
this paper was developed around an asteroid mission, 
the exercise provides important insights into the design 
of a long-duration, deep space habitation module.  Many 
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of the issues identified here would be equally applicable 
to a manned Mars transit vehicle, for example, or even 
future space stations.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Zapp, Neal, Space Radiation Protection Status and Challenges, Biennial Research Report, NASA Johnson 
Space Center, 2009. 
 
2 NASA, JSC-65795 Revision F, NASA Docking System (NDS) Interface Definitions Document (IDD), National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Houston, 2011. 
 
3 NASA, JSC-47223, ESPO Test 6: C9 Facility Space Suit Interface Evaluation Test Report, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Houston, 2009. 
 
4 CxP 70000, Constellation Architecture Requirements Document, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Houston, 2010. 
 
5   CxP 70024, Human-Systems Integration Requirements (HSIR), Appendix E, Revision E, National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, November 19, 2010. 
